[TheCapn]

Article briefly addresses that. They talk about how air gapping is easy to breach with a compromised flash drive.

But speaking from experience in the controls industry its the people who write the cheques. I don't work in systems like a nuclear power plant but the critical systems I help design are absolutely air gapped and secured from all basic user access. The business managers who want to remotely administer their system or check the data logs are the ones that introduce components susceptible to attack and hopefully integrators learn to stand their ground.

Another issue I see frequently, and not to discredit the brilliant engineers I work with, but there's too many non-software people in the software field. Too many electrical oriented people I work with figure software is just a slap on system that interfaces the user to the motor but fail to realize all the pitfalls it creates if not done in as rigorous of a manner as the electrical design.

[utefan001]

Sounds like these business managers need to buy one way transfer devices.