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by senekerim
3936 days ago
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I haven't read the paper, nor am I an expert, but the assumption (i) sounds fishy "the decision of which measurement is performed on a quantum system can be made independently of the system". By fishy, I mean obviously false. Which means being incompatible with this assumption is OK. I'm probably missing something... |
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In order for Bell's theorem (and a lot of subsequent quantum theory) to work, we have to interpret causal and statistical independence as being one and the same. But the more one learns about the theoretical justification for this conflation, the shakier it seems. Bell, in particular, justified it by claiming that it was unscientific to assume that experimenters didn't have free will. Okay, sure.
Any universe where the assumption that experimental measurement settings are always already statistically correlated with the state of the system being measured (even if that correlation would have to have been established millennia ago) is fundamentally weird in certain ways - these kinds of theories are sometimes called 'conspiracy theories' as it sort of seems like all the information is there and nature is conspiring to hide it from us. But there's a whole branch of super-determinist interpretations of quantum mechanics motivated by the sense that this kind of weirdness is not as bad as the kind of weirdness we'd have to otherwise accept. This kind of work has been out of fashion for a while, but it seems to be gaining a certain amount of momentum in the last decade or so.