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by panzagl
3937 days ago
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I think a lot of early game companies suffered from not really believing in the market for games, that they were a placeholder until they could make something more 'serious'. Even non-computer game companies like SPI and Avalon Hill spent a lot of effort chasing corporate and military uses when in retrospect they underserved their fans and customers. |
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> The company made the decision to create business software long before the games business took off. From the start, Infocom’s founders had intended to do more than just computer games; they wanted to be the leading software developers for personal computers. They tossed around various ideas for their first product, which included medical, database, office, and educational software. However, Zork seemed like the most viable option at the time because a working prototype already existed, and Berez and Blank were willing to work for IOUs to make it run on personal computers.
> The decision to move beyond games was also driven by the higher profit margins in business software. The customers of business software were typically willing to spend more money than mass consumers. Infocom could therefore charge significantly more for its products. Whereas a copy of Lotus 1-2-3 listed for $495, each of Infocom’s games sold for $30 to $50. The profitability of business software had even directly affected Infocom: when Personal Software pulled out of the games publishing business to focus on VisiCalc and sold back the rights of Zork, it told Infocom, “…games have a limited market (6000 units average) and at a limited price (under $100), while business software sells regularly and more profitably.”
> Infocom’s employees strongly believed that the same talent and skills that had made them successful in the games business could be applied to making successful business software. Many employees had experience at LCS tackling and solving tough problems. They had made Zork to show that they could make a better parser and improve various aspects of Adventure. In a memo dating back to spring of 1978, Blank talks about office automation systems and remote data entry. Showing confidence in the company’s versatility, he wrote, “We have accumulated a great deal of expertise in these areas, having already implemented systems in each of these areas,and probably have a good idea of how to implement anything we choose along these lines.”
> Many of the founders also believed that Infocom needed to diversify its product line to continue to grow. In particular, Vezza believed that while the games made money, they would“ not last forever.” Vezza believed that consumers had fickle tastes. At any point, people might cease to enjoy Infocom’s games, abandoning them in favor of something else. The business products market, however, differed in that respect. Customers of business software tended to invest heavily into applications and stick with them for a relatively long period of time.
> Additionally, many Infocom employees believed that some of Infocom’s founders, and particularly Vezza, felt embarrassed to be part of a company that made computer games. Zork was just a way to raise enough money to get started. No one had intended it to become the centerpiece of Infocom’s business, nor did anyone expect it to take off and spawn so many titles. The embarrassment over the games made some employees eager to forge ahead with Infocom’s original goals.