[z2]

It's interesting that the report states

"The G DATA security experts are certain that the manufacturers are not the perpetrators in the majority of cases. Renowned companies will not risk their reputation by distributing malware in the firmware."

Manufacturers have no qualms about installing bloatware and even spyware onto laptops. It would be interesting to know what standards, if any are used to sift out the malware from potential bloatware candidates.

[spiralpolitik]

Clearly the author does not consider Lenovo to be a "Renowned company" given that they have form for doing that very act. Twice.

[dogma1138]

While SuperFish was a security risk it wasn't a "malware", there is a difference between various really stupid and blatant backdoors and other security risks and actual malware.

Lenovo didn't use it to steal user's data they could care less about it, but some one could abuse it to compromise users both through compromising SuperFish it self and by exploiting the fact that SuperFish will issue certificates to SSL websites even if the original certificate isn't really valid which will allow attackers to MITM SSL connections.

Sony also had distributed software that could be classified as backdoors or rootkits in it's CD's as DRM, many other companies also had similar incidents.

While it's a stupid practice and quite unfair to your customers you can't really call it malicious since they didn't really used it for that just never thought it quite true or didn't care enough in the first place.

The packages in this case seem to be actual malware and not some adware/unwanted software installed by the vendors which while might be a security risk wasn't intended to actually compromise the user.