In this case, it may be. The territory is never observed other than through maps, and the maps are all math. That is to say, the maps may be of the same "stuff" as the territory, and as the differences between the maps and the territory are erased, eventually you arrive at the map being the territory.
At least, they are all math beyond those subjective observations that are possible through the human senses. You might think that some hot gas is "glowing blue", and that this is not "math" to you in any sense, but a more advanced understanding of the light emanating from it gives us a spectrum, and that is just a math function.
Of course when we look at an actual map of some place, we know that the place isn't a picture with symbols denoting its features. It's not so clear for features of the universe. When you're far from the bottom, the descriptions look like maps. The mass and acceleration arrows on a free body diagram of an automobile aren't the automobile; it's all just a diagram.
But the more detailed you make the description of something, the less of a distinction there is between the description and the thing! At some point, the description must be the thing. (If it isn't then just alter whatever is different between the two and patch the description; then repeat.)
Another thing to keep in mind is that math itself has map/territory descriptions. The formula or graph representing a mathematical object isn't that object.
When we say that the universe may just be math, we don't mean that the written math is the universe, but rather that the abstract math described by those representations is identifiable with what is real: the map isn't the territory, but those two territories are identifiable with each other!
> The territory is never observed other than through maps, and the maps are all math.
Be careful with words here. The universe is observed through other means than maps all the time. In fact, it is what everyone is doing all the time.
The universe is described using maths. It is also often described by neuron firing patterns in brains or less accurately using English or Russian. Just like territories are described by maps or less accurately using English or Russian.
> But the more detailed you make the description of something, the less of a distinction there is between the description and the thing! At some point, the description must be the thing. (If it isn't then just alter whatever is different between the two and patch the description; then repeat.)
That doesn't follow. At the limit to infinity, the description is the perfect description. There is no reason to believe it becomes the thing itself.
The line segment representing the radius of a circle perfectly describes a circle. That does not mean a line segment is the same as a circle.
The line segment representing the radius of a circle perfectly describes a circle. That does not mean a line segment is the same as a circle.
Aha, but there is a territory here: the abstract circle. Now suppose we equate that territory with another territory: something in the real world. Then we have a description of a circle (the map), but two different territories. If we say those are the same, it's not a map/territory confusion. At best it is a territory/territory confusion.
The description of the math will never be the math; but the correct math may in fact coincide with reality.
If a mathematical model of the world is completely accurate, then the math which it describes is the world. The world doesn't have any properties which the math doesn't and vice versa; it doesn't "do" anything which the math doesn't.
At least, they are all math beyond those subjective observations that are possible through the human senses. You might think that some hot gas is "glowing blue", and that this is not "math" to you in any sense, but a more advanced understanding of the light emanating from it gives us a spectrum, and that is just a math function.
Of course when we look at an actual map of some place, we know that the place isn't a picture with symbols denoting its features. It's not so clear for features of the universe. When you're far from the bottom, the descriptions look like maps. The mass and acceleration arrows on a free body diagram of an automobile aren't the automobile; it's all just a diagram.
But the more detailed you make the description of something, the less of a distinction there is between the description and the thing! At some point, the description must be the thing. (If it isn't then just alter whatever is different between the two and patch the description; then repeat.)
Another thing to keep in mind is that math itself has map/territory descriptions. The formula or graph representing a mathematical object isn't that object.
When we say that the universe may just be math, we don't mean that the written math is the universe, but rather that the abstract math described by those representations is identifiable with what is real: the map isn't the territory, but those two territories are identifiable with each other!