[cbsmith]

There's all kinds of math on techniques for being able to audit the vote without exposing individual voting behaviour. It is possible to prove to yourself that your vote was counted without exposing what your vote was to others, and also providing assurances that the result represents the aggregate of everyone's "votes". I don't think there is much about the important aspects of this design that require there be massive privacy issues. There are some variants around "honest verifiers" that work even more simply. Most of the homomorphic encryption excitement stems from some of the more sophisticated variants of that approach.

[jfager]

Do you have any pointers to papers describing how vote auditing techniques extend to liquid democracy? The Google paper doesn't even acknowledge the problem, much less describe a solution, and most of the other papers I've read on the topic are either extremely handwavy on the technical details of privacy or make the same assumption as Google, that its good enough to hide votes from the participants but 'the system' still knows.

[cbsmith]

I'm not sure I understand how liquid democracy would change the fundamental problem context in a way that would change the problem for homomorphic encryption...