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by notahacker
3955 days ago
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The Allies responsible for making the decision did have access to intelligence reports making it clear that senior representatives of the Japanese were trying to mediate an end to the war, including explicitly quoting many of the Japanese comments - both intentional communications and intercepts - to that effect. There's no shortage of notes to suggest that White House decision makers were aware of these and debated the possibility that including a guarantee of the Emperor's position in the Potsdam Declaration might have made surrender possible, but didn't want Russians as mediators and were more concerned about domestic opinion of demanding anything other than unconditional surrender than actually hastening the surrender. Ultimately these considerations (and others) took precedence over saving lives, and if anything is hindsight bias it's the [plausible] argument that a more stable, peaceful and prosperous Japan was achieved through insisting on total defeat and not involving any Soviet "mediation". |
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However we did signal flexibility to the Japanese about the Emperor's position; we weren't stupid, we knew that might be part of an acceptable and otherwise "unconditional" surrender.