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by rentnorove
3975 days ago
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On how HTTPS sites are compromised: > Compromised router answers DNS req for *.google.com to 3rd party with faked HTTPS cert, you download malware Chrome. Game over. So this is a DNS mitm? Doesn't it still require the faked cert to be signed by a trusted root CA? |
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Lots of people think nothing of a bounce from an HTTPS download link to an HTTP-only download link, and will happily ignore even flagrant warnings...
Root CA's have been compromised in the past, and will be again. I expect 0-day root CAs are up for sale somewhere as I type. It's not like the so-called "good guys" can't physically demand access to private keys, or big businesses can't out-right buy root trust (ex, "We need to do this on our private network - we'll never put it on the Internet, really. Here's a lot of money."). The root system is only as strong as it's weakest policies, and it's about as leaky as a steamer basket.
Even if an attacker can't get a directly useful signature, she can take control of a server already in possession of a valid cert, merely for hosting purposes (if Ubiquiti can be scammed, so can Google, as can you or I). This can be an inside job, or a one-off breach - all it takes is one click or breach of trust. (The DNS MITM tricks that work for the download can also be used to get between 2 parties higher up the trust heirarchy.)
And, of course, it is also always possible to buy a fresh, perfectly valid cert for a domain that looks close enough to pass the user test, or - quite alarmingly - one with UTF characters that combine to display in the address bar identically - or close enough - to the domain being impersonated.
That's just what comes to my mind immediately.
It's amazing any of it works at all, and arguably it doesn't. If you haven't be breached, it's probably because you haven't been targeted,