Since when has the angle of terrorist attack shifted back to blowing up planes instead of flying them into strategic targets?
A laptop with a fully charged battery can cause a lot more havoc over the Atlantic ocean than one with the drained battery. Presumably you could bring in a couple of extra batteries as well, because it's going to be a long flight.
If they're worried about someone building a bomb into the insides of a laptop that you can't turn on, then hasn't that been pretty much the core of airport security since its inception -- and pretty much a problem solved to all practical extents since several decades ago?
I mean, that's why they've been scanning all cabin baggage for decades to see if there are guns inside radios or tanks of interesting liquids inside some suitable item. They've been looking at the x-rays of laptops for twenty years, and now they suddenly start worrying about bombs being built into one?
And why aren't they worried about the cargo baggage which also contains electronic devices that are potentially uncharged? If they can spot bombs in the electronics in your big baggages without checking if they boot up, then why can't they do that for your cabin bags?
Unlike water bottles that you can dispose, this is going to be a big problem. You just don't leave your laptop or phone at some airport: you simply don't fly.
This makes absolutely no sense whatsoever, and the sickness spreads to airports outside US. This means we soon can't fly with uncharged electronics in Europe either because the same security gates can allow someone to board a flight the USA.
I'm just wondering who is it that benefits from all this? Where does the money go, who are the people who can push these endless rules and regulations for their own gain because there sure as hell isn't a gain for anyone else?
> They've been looking at the x-rays of laptops for twenty years, and now they suddenly start worrying about bombs being built into one?
Batteries on laptops and cell phones look like a big opaque block on x-rays[0]. And 6 grams of PETN can do a lot of damage[1].
New intelligence indicates that the AQAP bombmaker responsible for the underwear bomber and the printer bomber has figured out how to replace the battery with a bomb. It's not visible on x-ray, and it's sealed so it won't trigger the explosive trace detection equipment[2] either.
> And why aren't they worried about the cargo baggage which also contains electronic devices that are potentially uncharged?
Presumably these devices would need to be held directly against the fuselage as the underwear bomber failed to do[3], so they'd need to be carried by a passenger instead of in a random location in the baggage compartment.
And it's not about whether the battery is charged, it's about whether the device has power at all. Naturally TSA countermeasures are trivially circumvented. Replace the optical drive with a second battery, it still powers on even if the first battery has been replaced with a bomb.
Some reports say they're looking to surgically implant a device under the skin[4]. How do you screen for that?
And why aren't they worried about the cargo baggage which also contains electronic devices that are potentially uncharged?
Because you can't swap in a live battery in mid-flight if the device is stuck in the cargo hold, of course. I'm not sure what's so terrible about this, since most people will have a charger with them anyway. If their device happens to be out of battery but they can plug in the charger and demonstrate its safe operation, there's no problem. Indeed, this doesn't strike me as anything particularly new, rather an old story being recycled as churnalism.
A statement so vague that it could be construed to mean anything. Every minute adjustment of TSA standard procedures is intended to 'enhance' their security regime.
Swapping in a live battery probably isn't a problem. They want to see if the device works or not.
What I meant that if I build a bomb into a laptop, and use its battery space to contain the explosive so that it looks 99.99% the same in the X-ray, I can just put the bomb in the checked in baggage and have it in the cargo space while not having to show anyone that the device doesn't boot up.
But if they can already detect bombs built into devices such as laptops for checked-in baggage — which they obviously(?) and presumably do — then why can't they detect these bombs similarly for cabin baggage? They could just do that instead of asking the passengers to boot their devices.
> They also are concerned that hard-to-detect bombs could be built into shoes, said the officials, who declined to be identified because of the sensitivity of the issue.
> A laptop with a fully charged battery can cause a lot more havoc over the Atlantic ocean than one with the drained battery. Presumably you could bring in a couple of extra batteries as well, because it's going to be a long flight.
I have an external battery for my X220 which I use on long flights. Just out of curiosity I calculated the equivalent energy in TNT which the batteries hold. It was about 220g. And Li-ion are known for their explosive discharge.
Clearly it has nothing to do with the device being charged, but rather eliminating an excuse as to why the device doesn't have the ability to be powered on. (Allegedly proving it's a real device, and not a bomb being made to look like a laptop or phone.)
Is there any evidence that terrorists are capable of constructing a device that plausibly looks like a cell phone but is a bomb? Have they ever done this in the past?
What about laptops?
I do not think this is about security, so much as it is about punishing people who make it impossible for the relevant officials and spooks to snoop on the devices.
Despite appearing the New Zealand Herald, the story comes with a byline from the Daily Mail, which, for a story related to terrorism, reduces its credibility to zero.
And the Daily Mall's only source seems to be "unnamed' TSA officials. And the article lacks any real detail. Also, they threw this obvious false-hood in their article: "The Transportation Security Administration will not allow cellphones or other electronic devices on US-bound planes from now on."
Can we please remove this from the frontpage of HN until we have another source? I know a bunch of people are going to take the headline as fact without researching the source.
I guess the news is, a. don't forget your chargers! b. don't forget your power adaptors! c. remember to charge! d. make sure your device doesn't break in some repairable-but-for-the-moment-powerless way!
Otherwise, that Macbook Air is going to have to go in the bin along with the bottle of water and the toothpaste sonny jim, and there's nowt you can do about it.
(Wonder how long that will last - possibly until some celeb has their over-worked iPhone taken off them, and causes a social media stink).
From what I remember, Firewire used to have direct hardware access to the RAM. Does the iOS lightning charger have something similar?
I may be paranoid, but I could imagine the TSA offering little charging stations so you can get enough juice to turn the phone on, and from there it's a short leap to imagine that the other side of that "charger" is going to be something that sucks down as much information as they can from the phone.
While I don't doubt for a moment that the US Government has the technology to do this, I do doubt that the TSA, which is basically the government agency equivalent of the shortbus is allowed to have access to it.
It's not particularly difficult technology to pull off. The actual TSA agents are clearly dumb as rocks, but if you give them a machine that just sucks up data and sends it off to some central repository, they'll have no problem plugging it in.
From my understanding, they already can make sort of "notes" on your file - including books you have in your luggage, that sort of thing. It's not that crazy to imagine that they'd distribute some simple juice-jacking equipment if people are very frequently wanting to plug in.
They'd only be doing this for a tiny percentage of phones that travel through checkpoints, though- and it's not clear to me what they would be looking for.
If there was a real motivation to secretly snoop on every phone that passed through a TSA checkpoint they'd come up with a better excuse that would allow them to plug in every phone- or they would more likely just be upfront about it. They haven't really tried to be sneaky about any other invasive screenings, to my knowledge.
Ah, I am not in the Apple ecosystem, so I think I was mixing up the different types of connectors. Good to know that they make this sort of thing a priority, though.
I always assumed the x-ray machines would show operators if a phone or notebook seems to be tampered/modified. If looking at a boot screen makes the process more secure, we should really be concerned by the airport security in general.
My guess is that they have intelligence that someone is working very hard to do something that I've long worried someone would do, which is to make explosives look like the cells in Li-on batteries on x-rays.
If you look at an x-ray of a laptop or tablet, it's obvious where the batteries are, they're regular shaped objects much denser than the circuitry in the rest of the device.
If you mixed explosives with something to make them denser to x-rays (so that they look like lithium masses) and shaped them to look right, you would avoid the only really effective screening tool available. If you can do that, then sealing them and cleaning off residues to keep from setting off explosive vapour detectors would be trivial.
This way, they can verify that at least some of the batteries in the device are real. It still wouldn't prevent someone replacing some of the cells with explosive and wiring the rest to give the right voltage but less capacity but doing that would require custom battery controllers which is another step up in sophistication. Every step up in sophistication is an opportunity to intercept terror networks.
> My guess is that they have intelligence that someone is working very hard to do something that I've long worried someone would do, which is to make explosives look like the cells in Li-on batteries on x-rays.
That's a Hollywood movie plot.
If you wanted to mask it on X-rays, put it in a Play-Doh canister. It's not that damned hard to fake things out.
The terrorists, so much as they exist, aren't doing these things. Laziness? Uncleverness? I don't know why. But protecting us from imaginary threats by making our lives miserable is disgusting and intolerable.
> This way, they can verify that at least some of the batteries in the device are real.
If they can do that, what prevents them from putting a small battery in that will power it for a minute to get it past the check point?
Again, it's fucking stupid to try to protect the airlines from Hollywood movie plots. First, they never seem to happen, and second the misery the protection causes outweighs any possible benefits.
More people died in bathtubs that year than on September 11th. If they wanted to save lives, we'd have a war on bathtubs, not a war on terrorism.
Again, it's fucking stupid to try to protect the airlines from Hollywood movie plots. First, they never seem to happen
I was in Europe on September 11, 2001. I turned on the TV after a busy day and at first thought it was showing a disaster movie, until I changed the channel and found the same thing.
More people died in bathtubs that year than on September 11th. If they wanted to save lives, we'd have a war on bathtubs, not a war on terrorism.
This is not correct. 1/10th as many people died in bathtubs, although a similar number died in all drowning accidents (some of which are the result of heart attacks or other incapacity suffered while in the water, making the exact cause of death hard to establish): http://danger.mongabay.com/injury_death.htm Of course, we don't have to look far to find things that are more deadly than terrorism in the aggregate - motor vehicle accidents, for example, do kill a lot more people than terrorism does.
But what your argument fails to address is that accidental deaths are highly distributed and largely uncorrelated while terrorist activity is concentrated and systematic. The qualitative differences are huge, just as there's a huge difference between being hit by a pound of sand (not painful unless some of it gets in your eyes or you inhale it) and being hit by a rock of the same weight (painful and with much greater potential to be fatal). As well as the immediate economic and personal losses, catastrophic events also tend to set big changes in motion. It's highly questionable, for example, whether we would have invaded Iraq absent 9-11 and it's equally unlikely that we would have invaded Afghanistan.
Of course that doesn't mean we should organize everything around the very low probability of terrorist attack or any other concentrated risk factor, but to ignore the multiplier effects of concentration is also facile.
It annoys me to no end when people bring up the extreme overreaction to terrorism as justification for paying extra attention to terrorism.
You're mixing up cause and effect here. Invading Iraq/Afghanistan is not a reason to put a lot of effort into counterterrorism. It's a reason not to.
The US is like a country that's allergic to bee stings. The immune system is constantly finding new ways to fight bee stings harder and faster than before. And when we point out that the vast majority of the damage done by bee stings is actually done by the immune system's reaction, the counterargument is that we suffered a lot of damage in the last bee sting, so we need to react.
Imagine a "keep calm and carry on" reaction to 9/11 instead of the panic attack we actually had.
Yes, the differences are huge. And we should work to make them not be huge, instead of using the huge differences to justify making huge differences.
Too bad. I am equally inclined to roll my eyes when people make false equivalences between terrorism and things like weather or dispersed accidents. I don't see terrorism as a massive existential threat, but the idea that it will go away if ignored is just as foolish as over-reaction.
Imagine a "keep calm and carry on" reaction to 9/11 instead of the panic attack we actually had.
There is no country on earth that would respond to an attack of that scale with equanimity. You seem to forget that 'keep calm and carry on' was thought up as part of morale-boosting publicity campaign to be deployed as a response to the outbreak of war in 1939, although the plan was not put into practice. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Keep_Calm_and_Carry_On
Please try looking at actual historical examples instead of imaginary ones.
I'm not saying it would go away if ignored. I'm just saying that trying to decrease our reaction to it would be for the best. It's going to happen whether or not we want it. All we can realistically do is try to limit the damage, 99.9% of which we inflict on ourselves.
I don't understand why you think I "forget" anything or that my example is "imaginary". I am proposing a response and using a well known phrase to illustrate it.
"Bomb scanners" are really density scanners. If someone were able to make explosives that worked but were not the same density and known explosives, they would not have to hide them in batteries. The x-ray machines would not "see" them no matter how they were packed.
As other people have pointed out, the only use this order has is to prevent uncharged batteries from stopping the inspection of the data on a device.
Just buy a laptop that can hold two batteries but run off of one (e.g. ThinkPad T440) and replace one with a bomb. Computer still powers on with no modifications to any electronics.
How about taking out the guts of a 17" Dell XPS laptop and connecting its screen to the insides of a Sony Vaio ultrabook or a Macbook Air? That would give you over a quart of volume in which to pack contraband.
Not necessarily. Since the Macbook Air doesn't have a hard drive, you could disguise some kinds of contraband as the batteries, hard drive, and CD drive. Newer X-Ray machines might have the configurations of known laptops known by the software, but I doubt the personnel would be able to tell the difference if some effort is made to disguise the x-ray images.
"might have the configurations of known laptops known by the software"
Given the sheer quantity of hardware thats ever existed and the workflow I don't think this is a serious possibility.
I know pretty much every piece of ham radio gear every constructed has at one point gone thru the xray for "dxpedition" people. Along with pretty much all consumer electronics. It would be a heck of a lot simpler to mod a COTS radio from Radio Shack.
If everyone on the plane has their working cell phone on, then thats more data that can be collected during the flight .. over international waters .. from all of the targets of most interest (those moving between countries).
Honestly I won't even be mad if this were the case.
> does anyone know how many people were caught trying to smuggle explosives on a plain until now?
I believe exactly 0 caught by TSA. Given their job performance they should have all been fired by now and the department closed.
FBI and even regular passengers have in 10 years or so caught and stopped some terrorists. TSA hasn't claimed a single person they stopped red-handed with a bomb.
All they did was waste years and years of productive time, abused, molested people, stole goods expensive and cheap alike and so on.
It is a self-perpetuating cancer (not unlike any other large organization) that now that it has been created will come up with further excuses to stay in business.
At least FBI is smart enough once a while to find some feeble minded brain-washable idiot and entrap him (groom him) to make him buy chemicals for explosives and then claim "oh look we have prevented deh terrorism!" and throw the idiot in prison for life.
TSA isn't even competent to do those false flag like activities. It is a pure cancer spreading and consuming resources.
The somewhat more realistic problem is steal one of the zillions of fake plastic cellphones from zillions of cell phone retail stores, fill it with coke (the sniffing kind, not the drinking kind) and carry it across. Well, the drug sniffing dogs might get agitated about that. Prescription pills, perhaps.
It is supposed to be easier to put a bomb inside Phones and Samsung Galaxy then into any other kind of box? Is here anyone skilled in bomb making willing to explain?
Not that it matters (since none of these "security" measures pass anything even close to a cost-benefit analysis anyway), but you could imagine that phones or laptops would make particularly good bomb hiding places for a certain kind of bomb, because they're already packed with electronics, so it would be easy enough to replace the battery with plastic explosives and hide a detonator among the rest of the electronics there.
Of course, as people have pointed out, you could rig the battery itself to explode, or if you just need to turn the thing on, you could replace 95% of the battery with explosives and just leave enough power to turn it on and off. Like I said, it doesn't make any real sense, but there's a superficial argument for doing it this way.
> Validate the integrity of the device from looking at the screen?
Essentially, yeah. If you can't turn it on, it could be an IED disguised as a cellphone. (Or so the TSA seems to think)
Of course it's all just pointless security theater. I keep waiting for the general public to realize that these sorts of measures are useless wastes of money and demand they stop. I fear I'll have a long wait.
Or if you're even a wee bit sophisticated, get a smaller battery pack that'll last for 15 minutes and pack your explosives into the remaining 90% of battery space? How does the TSA not think of these blindingly obvious things?
"It is difficult to get a man to understand something, when his salary depends upon his not understanding it!"
Nobody is going to put themselves out of a job by saying, "Ubiquitous security screening doesn't work, as every countermeasure we come up with has obvious counter-countermeasures. Thus, we should shrink this agency by a factor of five and refocus our efforts in other areas."
But they can't just ignore threats either, because that gets you hauled in front of Congress the next time something happens. Thus, they ride a line of carrying out countermeasures that don't really help, but which are enough so that they can go to Congress and say that they did everything they could.
Wouldn't this be in relation to scanning/reading data on the devices rather than explosives? Having to charge a phone or laptop would increase time taken for processing as you'll need to charge the item momentarily whilst you interface with it.. I highly doubt they open up phones/laptops to connect directly to the HDD..
They might do so someday, but it has been explained time and again why this is not a very effective strategy: it will hit a relatively small number of people, it will be in an enclosed area so media access and thus graphic coverage will be limited, and airports are uniquely well-provisioned with emergency services because of the non-negligible risk of plane crashes, which will limit the impact. So the 'return on risk' for the terrorist is relatively low - it would scare people and put them off flying for a bit, but it wouldn't be an epic disaster.
Realistically it would be hard to kill more than 25-50 people, and the media coverage would consist of footage of ambulances, sober-faced people in uniform, and crying friends and relatives. Look at the history of conflicts where bombings were common, like Northern Ireland, and you notice that crowds don't necessarily mean mass casualties. The most deadly bomb set off during the Irish troubles was at an outdoor market in a town called Omagh, and killed 29 people - but that was a car bomb. Also, in a terrestrial bombing there are also tales of heroism as people help each other, emergency services turn up to help, and so on, which dilutes the sense of horror and helplessness. You could see that with the Boston bombing last year, which was ultimately more effective in drawing people together than it was in terrorizing them.
A plane blowing or otherwise falling out of the sky is a much bigger deal, because it will almost certainly mean the death of everyone on board, plus it has the potential to cause considerable destruction on the ground. Even excluding terrorism, there was high awareness of the Air France plane that crashed in the Atlantic and of course the Malaysian Airlines plane that mysteriously vanished earlier this year. In a terrestrial bombing, you might be unlucky and die, but you might also be lucky and suffer only superficial injuries, or be able to make it to safety, or whatever. In an aerial disaster you and everyone else are basically helpless because if the initial disaster doesn't kill you the fall will. Situations involving helplessness and inevitability are a great deal more frightening to people in general, more so when multiplied by a large number of people.
For what it's worth, the BBC bombing by one of the IRA splinter groups shook my then-house's windows, and I've been evacuated before that for IRA bomb warnings.
Maybe that's shaping my views when I think that the number of deaths isn't the only goal of terrorism. Rather, it's to scare and inconvenience people and the authorities.
Let's say "only" 20 people died. I think that would result in yet more security checks. I'd love to be wrong on this, and maybe that's why an attack like this hasn't happened to date - to paraphrase you, it'd be pointless.
I guess looking at it coldly, we should just be thankful that the on-the-ground expertise dies in every attack.
I don't quite buy it. The Boston bombs were extremely amateur and small, and yet they managed to shut down the entire city for a day. A big rolling suitcase full of powerful explosives and shrapnel set off in a security line at peak time in a large airport would be way worse. And if that's not enough, do it again, and again. One security line bombing a month until the end of time would be fairly easy and would cause complete chaos.
The real reason this doesn't happen is that there are almost no terrorists in the US in the first place. There is plenty of opportunity, whether it's airport security lines, sporting events, or simply using one of the sixteen thousand trivial ways to get contraband past the TSA. The only reason planes aren't constantly falling out of the sky and our airports aren't all smoking craters is that essentially nobody is truly willing to carry out such attacks in the first place.
A big rolling suitcase full of powerful explosives and shrapnel set off in a security line at peak time in a large airport would be way worse.
I gave you an example of a car bomb that killed only 30 people even though it was set off in a crowded market. Have you ever seen a car bomb go off? I have, it's huge. What's your basis for assuming that a suitcase bomb is going to be so much more devastating?
Certainly there is plenty of opportunity, but you're making a chicken-and-egg argument by saying there's very little terrorism, therefore security is a waste of time. I'm saying that that the payoff for the risk involved is not enough for most people.
And if that's not enough, do it again, and again. One security line bombing a month until the end of time would be fairly easy and would cause complete chaos.
I mentioned the northern Irish terrorist problem because I'm from Ireland and later lived in London. One bombing a month does not cause complete chaos, it just pisses people off and creates more public support for stiffer security measures, more intrusive surveillance and so on.
I suggest you step back from your assumptions of what would happen and look at available documentation of what actually does happen in countries with long-running insurgencies or terrorist problems, from the UK to Sri Lanka to Colombia, cases of actual disasters (whether engineered or accidental) at airports and public transit hubs.
The suitcase bomb was compared to the ridiculous pressure cooker bombs used in Boston, not car bombs. I did not state that they'd be worse than a big car bomb. I did not make any such comparison.
You misunderstand my argument. I'm not saying that there's very little terrorism, therefore security is a waste of time. I'm saying that many of our security measures are a waste of time because they don't stop terrorism, and I say this because they're trivial to bypass. That terrorism is so rare in this country is not because of agencies like TSA, but because there are approximately no terrorists to be stopped in the first place.
In places where there are a lot of terrorists, they carry out bombings pretty regularly. Regardless of whether you think it's effective, they clearly do. Yet they don't do it in the US. And it's not because TSA is stopping them, nor is anybody else set up to stop those sorts of attacks that regularly happen in places like Iraq. The only reasonable conclusion is that they don't happen because nobody here wants to carry them out.
If your device is charged you can prove it actually works; if it's not, you can say "Well, it works, but it happens not to be charged--that's why it isn't doing anything."
Presumably the idea is that techniques used to convert a laptop or phone into a bomb would render the device inoperable. It certainly seems like a harder task to make a bomb that is also a phone, rather than a bomb that used to be a phone.
Uncharged phones could be hidden explosives. To prove it's a electronic device, you have to turn it on. But it's kind of moot if you just explode the battery directly right?
Presumably, when security asks random passengers at random times to activate their mobile devices as proof that they're not some incendiary device, this rule eliminates the passenger's ability to claim it doesn't work because it's not fully charged. Plugging Yet Another Security Hole that terrorists could use!
How they plan to mitigate phones with bad batteries I have no idea- it's fully charged coming through security, but 30 minutes later, it's completely dead? Must be a terrerist [sic].
To add to your meme, turning on a phone also gets the device to ping out for cell towers, adding a data point to a large database out in the Utah dessert...
I hope that is going to be acceptable: my laptop is way too old for my battery to hold a charge, and I really only use it when I'm on the road. I'd hate to have to buy a new one simply to get it on the plane :(
A laptop with a fully charged battery can cause a lot more havoc over the Atlantic ocean than one with the drained battery. Presumably you could bring in a couple of extra batteries as well, because it's going to be a long flight.
If they're worried about someone building a bomb into the insides of a laptop that you can't turn on, then hasn't that been pretty much the core of airport security since its inception -- and pretty much a problem solved to all practical extents since several decades ago?
I mean, that's why they've been scanning all cabin baggage for decades to see if there are guns inside radios or tanks of interesting liquids inside some suitable item. They've been looking at the x-rays of laptops for twenty years, and now they suddenly start worrying about bombs being built into one?
And why aren't they worried about the cargo baggage which also contains electronic devices that are potentially uncharged? If they can spot bombs in the electronics in your big baggages without checking if they boot up, then why can't they do that for your cabin bags?
Unlike water bottles that you can dispose, this is going to be a big problem. You just don't leave your laptop or phone at some airport: you simply don't fly.
This makes absolutely no sense whatsoever, and the sickness spreads to airports outside US. This means we soon can't fly with uncharged electronics in Europe either because the same security gates can allow someone to board a flight the USA.
I'm just wondering who is it that benefits from all this? Where does the money go, who are the people who can push these endless rules and regulations for their own gain because there sure as hell isn't a gain for anyone else?