The fact that Clapper is still in office months after it was revealed that he had in point of fact lied to congress during sworn testimony should tell you everything you need to know.
The surveillance machinery formerly known as Total Information Awareness is being built and fielded with or without the consent of the governed and most definitely without the consent of those of us who don't happen to be "US Persons".
The only solution is for you to demand your correspondents use strong encryption and for all of us to help the less technically adept to reach the point where that is not an obstacle.
It is incredibly simple politics. He is in place to continue to soak up the bad publicity from the Snowden event. Once the bad publicity stops, he will step down. There is no point, politically, of taking him out right now. His replacement will end up tarnished with the bad PR as he starts his gig.
It seems as though the Intelligence Community is being forced back to 'siloing' since the pooled resource approach seems to be so vulnerable to singleton conscience-ridden whistleblowers. In a way this plays right into Assange's analysis of the cognitive structure of rule by conspiracy in that an organization can know things, but cannot both discuss them internally and keep them secret at the same time. In effect an attack that requires internal barriers to communication to prevent; is also an attack on the organizations overall cognitive ability.
> In effect an attack that requires internal barriers to communication to prevent; is also an attack on the organizations overall cognitive ability.
It is indeed. That was one of the issues noted by the 9/11 Commission formed by Congress, was that the institutional silos prevented the right people from acting on the available intelligence leading up to the 9/11 attack.
Of course NSA had hardly decompartmentalized; Snowden was able to sysadmin himself through many of the compartments, which is a hard enough problem to solve, but that may mean NSA might look and decide they don't need to retract from other IC agencies.
It is incredibly simple politics. He is in place to continue to soak up the bad publicity from the Snowden event. Once the bad publicity stops, he will step down. There is no point, politically, of taking him out right now. His replacement will end up tarnished with the bad PR as he starts his gig.
That is the usual way this goes. But we don't yet have the data to determine whether this is what's happening.
The situation may just be an indication that the NSA has joined the old Ma Bell and Italy's Berlusconi in being able to say "we don't care, we don't have to"
For me, this is probably the most worrisome evidence of the current state of the government. I know FDR said there is nothing to fear but fear itself, but I fear nothing more than the wizard of oz, and I fear the wizard and NSA are one and the same. Back to programming this stuff scares the crap out of me.
I used to live in the ex Soviet Union. Yeah, it was a time when things were thawing out, and people had stopped disappearing. One thing that was still there, that I remember, was a persistent fear of the state. Not acute, but kind of like a dull pain -- in the background, you feel it, and are aware of it. Jokes in private were made about the party and government, inefficiency and corruption. One had to be careful not too say too much in public, or they might find themselves without a job, or maybe worse.
With the recent NSA revelation, I am feeling the same kind of fear. I don't think they'll knock on my door later tonight. But instead I think about "should I post this comment?". Does it mean I will be put an a no-fly list? What if they mis-interpret my joke and then I can't get a job on a project because they'll read this joke 15 years later to me taken out of context? I would got to a protest to DC, but hmm, facial recognition will probably shove my image another another black list. Does that mean constant IRS audits from then on? Stuff like that.
It is not a fake fear, it is there. People engage in self-censorship already. I do it.
> I would got to a protest to DC, but hmm, facial recognition
The GPS radio/cellular radio are used to find and pinpoint protester identities, at least momentarily. It is an eventuality that local police departments get such devices for $30K, but right now they cost an order of magnitude higher and it's not quite plug-and-play.
That is a pretty interesting point. Though, this is DC we're talking about, so local PD probably has attachés from all sorts of 3 letter agencies and access to gear for limited times (with oversight, most likely). Protests that are organized, so far, seem to give ample notice (as far as broadcasting to people) as to when they will occur so coordination probably isn't that hard (and because events take place all the time in DC that probably require such efforts that aren't protests).
Though thinking about this makes me wonder: what types of things we'll see evolve to counteract this type of surveillance, and I'll extend, that are available now to some degree? I keep thinking back to ideas of generating noise, and I wonder what that could potentially look like, what the catalyst for demand for that type of hardware/software would be, and the incentives for the makers of it.
I find it interesting (and sad) how the last few months have shifted my perspective on Bruce Sterling's "Zenith Angle" from leaning more towards satire, to leaning more towards hard sci-fi/telling the "truth" with fiction.
The second link is based on a book from 2007 that used FOIA requests to be able to study the patches, so part of the point is that it's nothing new...
Anyway, I don't fall into the camp that takes the patches very seriously -- in general, anything a covert organization/project projects about itself is bound to be either propaganda or misinformation.
If you specifically choose definitions of words that don't agree with the typical usage and act like those were the definitions that were used when you were asked a question, you are, in fact, a big fat liar.
Clapper said, "No" and "not wittingly." That mind-rotting article you linked to is one guy speculating that he was put on the spot and had to say something in order to not confirm that they were openly spying on people...WHAT?
Everything we have seen makes it clear that they are spying on Americans and they obviously know they are doing it. Clapper's answer was thus a LIE. He was asked a question and gave an answer he knew was wrong. HE LIED. THIS IS THE DEFINITION OF LYING.
I wish someone around here would ante up and starting banning the shills.
Stop saying shills, this isn't Reddit. Critical thinking about issues here is appreciated. Everything unfortunately related to the NSA isn't cut and dry, black or white.
You really must not have understood the article, as it mentions testifying about top secret programs is not a simple task.
It may not be simple but it helps when you have the questions in advance.
"So that he would be prepared to answer, I sent the question to Director Clapper’s office a day in advance. After the hearing was over, my staff and I gave his office a chance to amend his answer," Wyden said.
I understood the article just fine! Did you? I don't care what his job is - he still lied! The internal logic of that piece is, "if he didn't deny it, people would think it was true!" The NSA was doing it anyway, so that makes fuck-all difference, now doesn't it?
I find it perfectly acceptable to lie during an open session hearing about top secret programs if those doing the questioning are doing it to be politically motivated, ie to embarrass the President.
If your hearing is actually looking for the truth and not looking to out top secret programs because you have an ideological reason against that, then fine do it in a closed door hearing, where I would think something like this should be done in the first place as to not harm national intelligence.
Just my intuition, but I just saw the 60 minutes piece on the NSA and the General Alexander scares the putties out of me. Something is very very wrong here.
This was public relations, plain and simple. Paint Snowden like a weirdo, ask softball question after softball question, give vague hints about the scary threats that deem this all necessary, and blindly trust the answers of the guy in charge of the entire operation, as if he had no incentive whatsoever to mislead anyone. Then wrap it all up with "Just how did we get this access that no other news agency could?" Gee, maybe it has something to do your extensive track record of reporting any story without even a shred of investigation into it's veracity.
Watching these "interview with officials" I always remember Manufacturing Consent by Edward Herman and Chomsky. It just explains so well the attitude, the approach, the type of questions asked, how they answered and how the presentation is done.
As a contrast, then there is a interview with Assange from a while back. It was immediately confrontational. He didn't have a chance to present his views or what the organization stands for, talk about "global persistent boogeymen", none of that. Reporter zoomed in on the rape (please, true or false?). And that's that. Due to the constraints and rules these agencies operate under and comparing the two approaches it is funny how similar the external effects to that of a state run propaganda agency. It is like having RT report on Putin pretty much.
John Miller might as well be a thawed out frozen sea bass and this piece might as well be a "released by NSA" PR piece. I would laugh normally as it is pretty funny, but this stopped being funny a while back, now it is just scary.
What annoyed me is that, as with anything, the devil is in the details. And the questions failed to clarify on details.
A few examples (all quotes paraphrased):
1. "we only listen to conversations of non americans"
-----Ok, so what happens when an American has a conversation with a non American? Do you tap it at all? Do you get both sides of conversation? Only one side?
2. "you can only look at a protected phone number if you have access"
----Awesome, but this is sort of a non-answer. How many people have access? How long does it take to get access? How easy is it to request access? Do you need access per phone number or if you get access for one protected number do you now get access to all of them?
3. "PRISM only lets us target US persons with probable cause under court order"
-----What is a US person? US Citizen? Person living in the US? This also contradicts so much of what I thought I knew about PRISM that I'm baffled that no clarification was asked for.
> What is a US person? US Citizen? Person living in the US? This also contradicts so much of what I thought I knew about PRISM that I'm baffled that no clarification was asked for.
Uh, these details were actually all hashed out in the media within the couple of weeks after PRISM was initially revealed.
USPER == Anyone in the physical borders of the United States, whether a citizen or an alien.
Likewise it is true even when PRISM was described that a USPER couldn't be accessed without an Article III warrant. The big question was whether this was a technical safeguard or a "analyst follows policy" safeguard. But even for non-USPER PRISM still required at least an NSL (which the receiving company could escalate to the FISC if they felt the NSL was illegal).
If this all surprises you about PRISM then I'd humbly suggest that you've been getting fed so much misinformation that you should possibly consider using alternate sources instead of sitting back in an echo chamber. ;)
Yes. Put them in front of a group of young college students that have had time to hone their critical thinking skills, instead of government media shills, and you will get a very different perspective.
Taking a wider view... it seems the politicians have not yet figured out that the Internet is a total game changer in terms of their ability to manage the political and social agenda, spin the "truth" and the events of the day in their favor, etc. Going on 60 Minutes to give your side of the story is so last century, lol. This was from a pre-Internet playbook and it won't work (except maybe on the older folks who still get their news and analysis from ABC/NBC/CBS but their numbers are dwindling as even that generation is going online now) but its all they know.
Here is a link to one of the best explanations that I have read about how the Internet has changed the social, political and power structures of our time. We are living in the greatest political and social revolution since the invention of the printing press. The entrenched powers can no longer use the press like 60 Minutes or the NY Times to maintain their control. Nobody knows how this will end.
At the very least, it's encouraging that the NSA feels the need to do keep up this sort of damage control because it suggests that people in the agency feel its public image continues to be damaged (or at least threatened) by the leaks. I doubt they would be actively trying to massage public opinion like this if the story had died by now, or if only a negligible portion of the public cared.
If you look at the "behind the scenes" stuff you see they avoided all the tough questions. It was less about the NSA's justifications for their actions as much as how the NSA and people feel about the situation.
Many people can't exercise critical thinking, or will be trusting of what is said, but none the less I am glad this was posted.
I have critical thinking skills, I can asses what is said based on it's merits, and I'm not the only one. So to me this was an interesting (though mildly infuriating) article.
I do believe it's fair to give the opposing position a fair say. In charged issues, it's not uncommon for anything an opposing party said to be labeled as malicious propaganda, while supporting parties hurling emotionally charged insults are propped up as uncompromising paragons of truth.
This should be taken at it's word, this article is telling us that many people in the NSA truly believe that holding this much data on everyone isn't a problem, that there are such devastating threats (such as a BIOS virus who's vector is social engineering). That the meta data is harmless.
Like how they start off right away saying Snowden cheated on the test to get hired and then discuss his "weird" habits. Seems the same as most high profile interviews - the interviewer is so thrilled to get an exclusive they just gobble up whatever they're told.
Again he is spinning/lying about the word "collecting". Their interpretation of collection is still collecting + looking at it, while the rest of world still interprets collection as collection.
Yes, they keep saying that as if all the collected data wasn't already "looked at" through keyword alerts or similar systems, or that they wouldn't give themselves permission to look manually at someone's data anyway.
Also last I checked, the 4th Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches (I would think searching/fishing for elements in the data through autonomous systems, is still called "searching", no?) and seizures (i.e. collections).
4th Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches of persons, houses, papers, and effects.
It has never prohibited the government from doing other searches, otherwise government agencies would not be able to subpoena business records about you from third parties.
Sometimes Congress passes separate laws adding a specific requirement to obtain a warrant before doing a certain type of search, and the Supreme Court has also acted to expand 4th Amendment protections to include 'reasonable expectation of privacy' (concerning a phone booth conversation in an otherwise public place) but even in that case the Supreme Court specifically abrogated the concept of a general "right to privacy".
Wouldn't an average, reasonable person in today's age consider an email or digital file to be a modern version of a "paper" or a cell phone to be a modern "effect"?
Well that already is that the case, but that would only prevent the government from searching the cell phone or computer itself (which is why you don't hear of NSA hacking into Americans' computers), not from intercepting communications made by the cell phone or computer once it leaves the home.
It irritates me when they use the term "taken" or "lost" when referring to the data that was leaked or copied. The verb taken works best for physical document. Lost would mean that the physical document was taken or stolen and is not replaceable.
That battle was already lost once regarding piracy. According to the media it's not copyright infringement, copying, or duplication. It's stealing the movie. This allows pseudo-advertisements like "you wouldn't steal a car" to exist. (I would definitely copy a car is I could!)
"He was taking a technical examination for potential employment at NSA; he used his system administrator privileges to go into the account of the NSA employee who was administering that test, and he took both questions and the answers, and used them to pass the test."
WHAT? He was a potential employee at the NSA but was already a system administrator, guys. That's the only reason this all happened - because he's a liar, cheater and thief! Down with Snowden!
What a puff piece if ever there was one. I'm actually concerned that 60 Minutes would actually air such obviously pro NSA propaganda especially after their Bengazi disaster. How anyone can take this seriously is beyond me. And the fact that Alexander could blatantly lie to the world on national television is outrageous.
Here we go again with the false dichotomy of metadata vs data.
There Is No Difference. Collecting metadata enables you to infer some data, psychology, and behavior directly, or you can identify the individual and cross-reference with other databases that contain data.
FWIW, some of the revelations in the NSA video isn't particularly new - you can get a sense of how the NSA operates by visiting Palantir's website (they create custom software for agencies like the NSA). I highly suspect that the video reveals that software in action for forming links with phone metadata.
Contrary to a lot of what has been said on HN, a lot of what the NSA does is good for the US. It would appear Gen. Alexander sidestepped talking about some of the questionable behavior that has occurred, but on the whole, the NSA operates with the right mindset. Anything on foreign grounds are free reign for any country to operate in, and it has always been that way in the broader intelligence community. The US has just been especially good at it.
Computing power & ability are getting ever more daunting. The knowledge about the fragility of computers are getting ever more accessible. What would a lot of you do about thwarting cyberthreats of varying natures to the US, were you in the position to have to protect such a powerful entity? Would you leave the US vulnerable if it meant erring strictly on privacy, which still has the potential to be prone to mistakes? Metadata in itself is a powerful intelligence tool. Should the intelligence agencies never have access to it? Under what conditions should it be available? What would you do in the event that time is of the essence, and bureaucracy ends up preventing you from accessing the vital information you needed to stop a terrorist plot? It is hard for people to know about what successes intelligence agencies may have - it's a damned if you do, damned if you don't situation, since the information often needs to remain classified for foreign relations, but if you fail to save lives, you are then blamed for failing your country, as the intelligence agencies were for 9/11 due to inadequate data sharing & exactly the type of bureaucracy that was later decreased.
I have some insight as to how the NSA operates, based on prospective employers reaching out to me for interviews, including workgroups in companies who contract directly with the NSA and the NSA itself (I was approached for a role as a mathematician as soon as their hiring freeze was over, my specialty was number theory, including analytic & algebraic number theory, precisely the NSA's domain) - those intelligent and who have interviewed in this field should be able to extrapolate generally how the NSA likely operates without having worked there.
I respect the mission, and personally don't have a huge problem with how the NSA operates. I wouldn't work for them ever anymore though, I picked a different career.
One thing I think people on HN should do though is think critically about this though, and not automatically go into scared-mode/hive-mode due to the amount of data involved. Think it through logically, as you would with any other problem. I think most of you would understand that this is a far more complex issue than many here have made it out to be. One may still potentially arrive at the same conclusion that the NSA overstepped their bounds on a high moral level, but you will gain more of an appreciation for the high moral level that the NSA attempts to operate in generally, which should be a surprise if you haven't thought about this prior to this incident given the world history of espionage and intelligence.
It's pretty faint praise if you have to argue that a lot of what <insert name> does is good. It's like listening to someone in an abusive relationship.
They have willfully violated privacy expectations of individuals and corporations, and they seem to have enjoyed doing it (the slide deck showing how they sniff google data comes to mind).
They do have a big job to do, but "protecting the US as an entity" is not a risk to the extent you imply. Even additional terrorist attacks on the scale of 9/11 are not going to threaten the future of our country. Furthermore, even in the presence of such pervasive surveillance by the NSA, we are still vulnerable to attacks of terrorism, such as the Boston Marathon bombings. The American citizen is not really any safer than before, and in fact is more vulnerable to abuse by those with access to sensitive personal data.
What's happening now is in fact a good deal of logical thought. The question is whether the NSA's operations need to be severely curtailed and/or monitored.
Finally, if you're looking for the scared-mode people, I would suggest looking to the individuals who have put their personal freedoms at stake to try and bring evidence of wrong-doing to light.
On the contrary, it is the risk I imply/have stated. I don't work in intelligence, but I am an infantry Marine reservist - some of the tactics briefed to us on how foreign governments and terrorists try to compromise opsec might surprise many, including using Facebook to try to determine troop movements. Our enemies are also sophisticated.
It's just not as simple as you have stated so far. I'm not making an absolute claim that the NSA did not violate privacy or such - I was primarily pointing out some of the complexities involved here that privacy advocates tend to forget, especially when considering the history of foreign intelligence gathering, where privacy is not guaranteed by any nation because such a guarantee cannot be backed.
Quick Question about encrypted email: For extremely sensitive data, rather than mess with PGP for Thunderbird and private and public keys. Can't you just email a TrueCrypt container with a hidden TrueCrypt container inside of it back and forth between your clients?
You'd have to find a way to negotiate the volume password electronically if you didn't do it in person, which in turn would basically just be asymmetric crypto, which would probably lead you to PGP.
LOL. NSA is spying on all H1B employees, foreign students and rest of the world. If they have that capability I am not sure how exactly they would filter out US persons.
Secondly, these people have the history of lying to Congress itself. I am not sure if they give any shit about media and general public.
As a non-american one thing is absolutely clear to me. Given two equal services always choose a non-american one.
The surveillance machinery formerly known as Total Information Awareness is being built and fielded with or without the consent of the governed and most definitely without the consent of those of us who don't happen to be "US Persons".
The only solution is for you to demand your correspondents use strong encryption and for all of us to help the less technically adept to reach the point where that is not an obstacle.